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A B S T R A C T
The final step that Portugal is taking to reach a fully liberalized electricity market is the deregulation of the retail
market by phasing-out regulated electricity prices and reducing the administrative burdens in this area. These
attempts are done to promote the entrance of companies into the retailing business and to actively engage the
end-users in the market. This analysis shows that despite high consumer switching rates during the 2013–2015
period, the retail market in Portugal is still highly concentrated. The retail rates are also not following the
changes in the wholesale market price.
1. Introduction
Liberalization reform in the electricity sector starts with the priva-
tization of the state-owned electricity monopolies and unbundling the
vertically integrated structure (Joskow, 2008). The primary objective of
this reform from the economic and regulatory perspective is to sharpen
competition in generation and retail, in order to obtain efficient utili-
zation of available resources in the short run and efficient expansion in
the long run (Shen and Yang, 2012). Distinctly separated players at
generation, distribution, and retailing are considered in the reference
model of decentralized electricity markets. In vertically integrated
electricity markets, power supply and network services are provided by
the same utility as one service (Kuleshov et al., 2012), which contrasts
to restructured electricity markets where the network activities and
retailing businesses are separated. Vertical integration between gen-
eration and retailing is avoided in most of the competitive decentralized
electricity market models (Finon and Boroumand, 2011). Liberalization
has opened wide opportunities for smaller companies to enter the
wholesale electricity market or retailing business.
In many retail electricity markets, in order to introduce competi-
tion, the regional monopoly was dismantled and the distribution system
operation and retailing business were separated (Kuleshov et al., 2012).
In some cases, a Distribution System Operator (DSO) is allowed to en-
gage in retailing businesses. The minimum requirement, in this case, is
the separation of accounts for the competitive and monopolistic
activities (Kuleshov et al., 2012). All suppliers should have access to the
distribution network at regulated non-discriminatory rates (Littlechild,
2006b). Retail competition has the potential to provide several fi-
nancial and environmental benefits for the customers. In a liberalized
retail electricity market, customers may benefit from more structurally
diverse services through competition among service providers. Retail
competition allows them to select offers that best meet their needs,
regarding price and service quality (Joskow, 2008). Liberalization also
should promote the integration of distributed renewable energy sources
into the grid. In the traditional electricity industry only large producers
generated power, but diverse scales of distributed generation (DG) units
or retail companies with self-generation can exist in the liberalized
retail market (Bae et al., 2014). Despite these potential benefits, the
liberalization has not always led to lower prices for all customers (Von
Der Fehr and Hansen, 2009).
After opening the retail market, new groups of suppliers emerged in
the market. In most countries, independent pure retail companies that
focused mainly on marketing entered the retailing business. Most went
bankrupt and others have hardly survived because of the volatility in
wholesale market prices (Defeuilley, 2009). The operational cost of
these companies is composed of the billing cost, costs for marketing and
information systems, and the energy acquisition costs at spot market
prices in the wholesale market (Finon and Boroumand, 2011). Some
tried to diversify their contract types and develop value-added services.
All these approaches only helped them gain positions in the market for
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short periods, because they were quickly adopted by rival companies.
Furthermore, liberalization reform in retail electricity market attracted
companies from other geographical zones and companies from other
industrial sectors, such as oil and gas, to electricity retail business
(Defeuilley, 2009).
Portugal is moving forward with the liberalization reforms in the
electricity sector, following the same path of other European liberalized
retail markets. The retail market has been opened gradually for con-
sumers, starting from customers supplied at high voltages. The
Portuguese Energy Services Regulatory Authority (ERSE) will set the
quarterly transitory tariffs for domestic customers until the end of 2017
to encourage the transition from the regulated market to the liberalized
market (ERSE, 2016; EDPSU, 2016). This policy has led to high cus-
tomer switching rates from the last resort supplier to the liberalized
market suppliers. The switching rate of final customers refers to the
number of end-users who decide to change their supplier when the
retail services are liberalized. It is a commonly used indicator for the
level of buyer commitment in a market (Concettini and Créti, 2013).
Retail market liberalization aims to convert the electricity con-
sumers into active players of the retail market, which search among an
array of competitive retail companies for the best offer and switch to
their desired company. The competition-restricting regulation and price
controls are removed to increase the consumers’ options and to en-
courage the suppliers to offer innovative products. The products offered
to customers in a retail electricity market can be hardly differentiated.
This situation puts the competition mostly on price and the contract
type. The services are differentiated by offering dual fuel contracts,
flexible billing, demand response programs, and energy efficiency ser-
vices.
Retailers shield the end-users from the price volatility risks by
making fixed price contracts with them regardless of spot price changes
(Finon and Boroumand, 2011). Retailers act as financial and physical
intermediaries between the wholesale market and the end-users. They
are always exposed to price risk on the market and quantity risk on the
demand side, because electricity prices in the market are extremely
volatile and loads are unpredictable. Therefore, they have to implement
effective strategies to hedge the volume and price risks of the uncertain
delivery obligations in the market (Finon and Boroumand, 2011). The
most common approaches that the retailers adopt to keep a certain
consistency in their return is re-integrating with the generation com-
panies after the unbundling or making long-term bilateral contracts
with them. These methods help them to hedge against the energy price
volatility (Murray et al., 2013). The risk management strategies that are
only based on spot market purchases or bilateral contracts are not re-
liable or efficient enough to hedge the risks faced by retailers
(Defeuilley, 2009). Retailers in electricity markets lack two main
functions of retailers in other industries: (1) transmission and dis-
tribution of electricity is not under their control and (2) as their product
is a homogeneous good, the opportunity for transformation and mar-
keting is limited (Defeuilley, 2009).
The main motivation for retail market liberalization is to benefit
customers through efficiency gains, price reductions and improvements
in the quality of services (Karahan and Toptas, 2013). This study
evaluates the performance of retail electricity market liberalization in
Portugal, focusing on prices. Portugal experienced the highest
switching rate among the EU member countries in the years
2013–2015. However, there are doubts about the performance of the
competitive market going forward. The high switching rates are ex-
perienced during the transition period, when the regulator sets quar-
terly transitory tariffs. Findings of this research will benefit policy-
makers in Portugal. To the best of our knowledge, no studies have
evaluated the liberalization procedure in Portugal, and this study thus
contributes to the literature in this area.
The paper is divided into seven sections including this introduction.
Section 2 reviews the literature on retail market liberalization experi-
ences in other countries. Several examples of success and failure for the
retail market liberalization can be seen. In section 3, the process of
electricity market liberalization in Portugal at the wholesale and retail
levels is reviewed. Section 4 introduces the methodologies, indices and
data used in this analysis to evaluate retail market liberalization in this
case. Findings for the Portuguese retail electricity market are presented
and discussed in section 5. Finally, in section 6, the conclusions and the
policy implications are derived.
2. Previous studies
Generally, the research on retail electricity market benchmarking is
limited. Most studies have focused on a particular feature of the liber-
alized markets (London Economics, 2012).
Opening the retail markets for competition and removing the re-
strictive regulations was first tested in Norway and then in Britain
(Defeuilley, 2009). Later, many countries in the European Union, New
Zealand, and several states in the United States and Australia carried
out retail electricity market restructuring (Defeuilley, 2009; Kuleshov
et al., 2012). Defeuilley (2009) investigated the reasons why liberal-
ization reform was not able to meet expectations. Two issues were
identified for this condition: (1) the complexity of the determinants of
choice for consumers, and (2) the technological paradigm in the elec-
tricity sector. The first issue yields inactivity of many consumers, even
when they had apparent interests for switching to another retailer. The
second issue limits new entrants’ potential for innovation. Von Der Fehr
and Hansen (2009) analyzed household and retailer behavior in the
Norwegian market, based on price data and market characteristics. The
retail market in Norway was opened simultaneously for all customer
segments, unlike other EU countries that gradually opened the market.
The regulatory framework is believed to be one of the main reasons for
success. The continuous and substantial variation of electricity prices
between seasons and years has increased the awareness about the prices
and has facilitated the price-based competition (Von Der Fehr and
Hansen, 2009) (Mirza and Bergland, 2012). found a substantial asym-
metry when retailers pass the impact of wholesale market price changes
to the retail customers in the Norwegian market. Price increases were
transmitted to customers under the variable price contracts more
quickly than the price decreases. Mirza and Bergland (2012) proposed
that the end consumers should switch to spot price contracts and make
use of smart grid technologies if they do not want dominant retailers
with market power to rule the market. This strategy will also help them
to deal with asymmetric price-setting behavior.
The evolution of retail market competition in the UK residential
energy market is described by (Price, 2005), who assessed the extent to
which consumers in general and vulnerable households, in particular,
have been influenced by liberalization. The findings of this paper show
that the expected price increase for vulnerable customers due to tariff
re-balancing was not realized.
The Ministry of Economic Development in New Zealand together
with a panel of independent experts appointed by the Ministry of
Energy and Resources conducted a review on market performance in
2012 (Shen and Yang, 2012). They made several policy recommenda-
tions to address the lack of competition in the market. The main bar-
riers to entry and competition in the retail electricity market were di-
agnosed as the transmission constraints, the absence of the liquid
energy hedge market, and the vertical integration of generation com-
panies and retailers (Shen and Yang, 2012). The policy recommenda-
tions in the review were to (1) develop the liquid hedge market, (2)
allow distribution companies back into retailing business with some
restrictions, and (3) provide funding for the promotion of consumer
switching (Shen and Yang, 2012).
The success of retail electricity markets is measured by the changes
that the liberalization brings about for end-users in term of energy price
and their sensitivity to price changes. Nakajima and Hamori (2010)
calculated the price elasticity changes in the US electricity market to
evaluate whether household sensitivity to retail rate changes is a
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consequence of electricity market restructuring. No statistically sig-
nificant difference was noted between the states that restructured and
those that did not. Retail choice policies were not distinguished as the
main cause of the price elasticity differences. Economists with the US
Federal Reserve bank, Dallas branch used a dynamic panel approach
and a data set of US states in (Swadley and Yücel, 2011) and found that
the retail competition lowers the rates when consumer participation is
high but raises the rates when it is low. Karahan and Toptas (2013)
explored the impact of retail electricity market liberalization in Turkey
during the transition period to see if price declines for consumers have
been achieved. Using economic and financial indicators, this research
showed that liberalization did not lead to expected results. The retail
rates were not following the reductions that occurred in wholesale
market prices.
The failure of the liberalization process in achieving its objectives
can be shown by the high portion of inactive end-users that show no
interest in changing suppliers (i.e., markets with low switching rates),
difficulty of competition for new entrants against the incumbent com-
pany, and the lack of innovation in energy products and services after
opening the market for several years. In many countries, the historical
suppliers have the highest market shares and the switching rates have
remained very low several years after establishing the liberalized retail
market. Alternative suppliers also face entry barriers and difficulties to
compete with the incumbent companies. The competition in the
Russian retail electricity market after passing the transition period to
the liberalized market is assessed in (Kuleshov et al., 2012). The find-
ings are compared with the market condition at the beginning of this
period. The main indicator used for evaluating the competition degree
in this research is the market share of retailers. The social, political and
technological barriers to market liberalization in Russia have been
studied. Findings show that four years after market opening, the his-
torical suppliers still dominate the market.
Some markets have adopted restrictive policies on incumbent re-
tailers to ensure the survival of new entrants. For instance, the low
market entry barriers in Texas attracted many suppliers to enter the
market. The “price-to-beat” mechanism in Texas put a floor under the
retail price of incumbent companies to avoid undercutting the prices of
new entrants in order to allow them to become established. The “price
to beat” should be high enough to ensure a modest profit for new en-
trants and it should be above the production costs (Tierney, 2008). This
transition period took place during the first five years after opening the
market.
The necessary functions in a competitive retail market are per-
formed based on information collected from different sources, mainly
from the consumers. Therefore, efficient information exchange is a
critical component of retail competition, and the success of a retail
market may depend on the existence of a reliable cyber infrastructure in
addition to widespread smart metering (Bae et al., 2014). Smart meters
make the consumers more aware of their energy use and able to par-
ticipate in demand response programs. There exist significant variations
among the EU Member States in the deployment of smart metering. It is
expected that almost 72% of European consumers will have a smart
meter for electricity by 2020 (European Parliament, 2015). In the EU
Member States where the cost-benefit analysis is positive, there is a
rollout target of 80% market penetration by 2020 (European
Commission, 2016).
3. Electricity market liberalization in Portugal
Liberalization is a broad term. It usually refers to reducing the
government regulations and restrictions in the economy, in parallel
with providing opportunities for high participation of the private en-
tities. Liberalization of electricity markets is a process that starts with
the shift in ownership from public to private hands, followed by re-
structuring of the companies, and advanced by fundamental and
structural changes in the way that the sector operates (Karahan and
Toptas, 2013).
Portugal is currently on track with its privatization efforts in dif-
ferent sectors. It has supported privatization of the state-owned entities
since joining EU in 1986, in compliance with the EU directives. Joining
the European economic and monetary union has accelerated the pri-
vatization activities in Portugal in line with other member countries
(Bräuninger, 2013). The outcomes of the liberalization process in each
country can be highly variable with similar experiences in other
countries (Karahan and Toptas, 2013).
Legal unbundling of the electric transmission network in Portugal
ended in 2000, when the high voltage network was separated from the
distribution network. Redes Energéticas Nacionais (REN) is the trans-
mission system operator of Portugal (EU, 2014). REN's main share-
holders are China State Grid Group, with 25% and Oman Oil with 15%
(Macauhub News Agency, 2015). EDP Distribuição owns approximately
99% of the distribution network in mainland Portugal and serves more
than 6 million customers as the distribution system operator. Besides
the high-voltage (60 kV), medium-voltage (specifically the 30 kV, 15 kV
and 10 kV) and low-voltage overhead and underground power lines, the
distribution network consists of sub-stations, transformer posts, and
other necessary equipment. The facilities used for public lighting are
also part of the distribution network. EDP is the holding company of
several electricity retailing and generation companies and also Portu-
gal's distribution services provider. These individual companies have
requirements on separation within the corporate structure. EDP's lar-
gest shareholder is China Three Gorges company with 21% share
(Roberts, 2015). The first main shareholders of REN and EDP are Chi-
nese state enterprises.
EDP's distribution activity is regulated by the Portuguese energy
services regulatory authority (ERSE). The regulatory authorities have a
key role in promoting competition and switching opportunities in
electricity markets (ACER/CEER, 2015). These government-in-
dependent entities, which have administrative and financial in-
dependence, monitor the market to ensure the competitive and ade-
quate functioning of the market (Conejo et al., 2010). ERSE is
responsible for regulating the electricity and natural gas sectors in
Portugal and fits supervision into its strategic performance. It protects
the interests of electricity consumers, particularly the vulnerable cus-
tomers, with regard to prices, service quality, and access to information
and provides a web tool for communication and interaction with dif-
ferent players of the retail market from electricity suppliers to custo-
mers (ERSE, 2016). It also provides a billing simulator for customers
(ERSE, 0000). ERSE always checks if the suppliers are publishing the
offers that they have practiced in the market on their websites, to
guarantee the transparency of the information that the suppliers pro-
vide for the end-users. The information on the suppliers' websites is also
reconciled with the reference prices sent to ERSE (ERSE, 2016).
In July 2007, the Portuguese and Spanish wholesale electricity
markets joined together to create the Iberian electricity market, MIBEL
(Vagropoulos and Bakirtzis, 2013). MIBEL replaced the former power
purchasing agreement (PPA) model. OMIP is the derivatives market
operator located in Portugal, and OMIE is the spot market operator
located in Spain. The Iberian electricity market splits when the inter-
connection capacity between the two countries is congested. Thus, the
generation and demand in both countries can only participate in their
internal market.
The integration into the Iberian Market improved the competition in
both countries because the market share of the regional generation
companies was reduced in the integrated area in comparison to their
regional markets. The integration of the Iberian market has also influ-
enced the competition at the retail side. Although retail markets are
usually considered as national or regional markets, the firms partici-
pating in a wholesale market have tried to cross the borders and enter
the local retail market of the countries connected to the same wholesale
market (ERSE, 2016).
The generation of electricity in Portugal is open to competition. In
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practice, however, it operates through remuneration schemes, such as
PPAs, guaranteed compensation mechanisms, and feed-in tariffs. The
market concentration of the electricity generation is high in Portugal
(EU, 2014), and the incumbent company EDP has the highest market
share in electricity generation in Portugal (45% in 2014) (OECD, 2013;
EU, 2014). If the transmission capacity between Portugal, Spain, and
France increases, the market share of EDP will reduce in Portugal. In
2004, the European Commission decided to prevent the acquisition of
GDP (Gás de Portugal), the incumbent gas company in Portugal, by EDP
and ENI (an Italian energy company) in order to restrain the dominant
position of EDP in the Portuguese electricity wholesale and retail
market (Conte et al., 2005).
The process of the liberalizing the electricity and natural gas mar-
kets that began in 2000 will be complete when the phasing out of
regulated tariffs finishes (ERSE, 2013). The phasing-out of regulated
tariffs encourages the end-users to change their retailer and promotes
the entrance of new companies into the retail market. In Portugal, the
regulated retail tariffs ended at July 1, 2012, for normal low voltage
consumers with contracted power equal to or greater than 10.35 kVA
and at January 1, 2013, for normal low voltage consumers with con-
tracted power less than 10.35 kVA (ERSE, 2013). It means that the
regulated tariffs are no longer available for the new Portuguese elec-
tricity and gas consumers from January 1, 2013 (ERSE, 2013). Con-
sumers should find energy suppliers in the market by the end of the
transition period and make new contracts with electricity and gas re-
tailers (ERSE, 2013). During the transition period, consumers have the
opportunity to compare and evaluate the offers of the electricity and
gas suppliers (ERSE, 2013). In Portugal, the electricity retailers offer a
fixed-price product to the customers. The price is usually set for one
year, but can have different tariffs during a day.
The transition period is for the gradual transfer from the regulated
market to the free market. It ended on December 31, 2014, for con-
sumers with contracted power equal to or greater than 10.35 kVA and
on December 31, 2017, it ends for consumers with contracted power
less than 10.35 kVA. The quarterly transitional tariffs are set until the
end of 2017 by the ERSE for consumers who are supplied by the last
resort supplier (ERSE, 2013; EDPSU, 2016). After the transition period,
the consumers should select the retailer from the liberalized market
(ERSE, 2013), and the ERSE will no longer set the regulated tariffs
(ERSE, 2013). Switching either the retailer or the product has no direct
costs for the Portuguese clients. There is an exception for economically
vulnerable customers, who will have access to regulated social tariffs
(ACER/CEER, 2015). However, the tariffs for accessing the network will
still be set by ERSE after this period (ERSE, 2013). The phasing out of
the regulated tariffs will cover 5.6 million electricity consumers in
continental Portugal (ERSE, 2013). If a retail supplier fails to supply its
consumers, the last resort supplier, which is the EDP Serviço Universal
in Portugal, will serve its clients.
Most consumers in Portugal have a long established relationship
with EDP. They have learned to use the energy service from this in-
cumbent company during the several years of usage. There might be a
great willingness to sign contracts with this company after the removal
of regulated tariffs.
On-line electricity price simulation tools are provided by the reg-
ulators for the end-users to help them in selecting the retail company.
Implementing smart metering enables retailers to benefit from possible
demand response programs. It also facilitates supplier switching and
enables more frequent information on consumption and billing (ACER/
CEER, 2015). The smart metering roll-out is not planned for the coming
years in Portugal. Electricity end-users and suppliers can both access to
detailed information about energy consumption with the smart me-
tering technologies installed at the end-points of the network. The pilot
project of InovCity in the city of Évora, which is led by EDP Distribuição
aims to represent the strategy of the company for smart grids. More
than 30,000 smart meters and 340 distribution transformer controllers
have been installed in Évora (Torres, 2011). Several other mini-pilots
were also implemented across the country. Nevertheless, these pro-
grams are very limited and cannot respond to the needs of the country
in future years.
4. Data and methodology
In this paper, we are interested in evaluating the performance of the
liberalized retail electricity market in Portugal. Earlier studies on the
Portuguese electricity market focused mainly on the competitiveness of
the wholesale market (Ferreira et al., 2007). conducted one of the
earliest studies on the restructuring process in Portugal's electricity
sector. It was carried out before the operation of the free Iberian market
(Amorim et al., 2013). assessed the amount of electricity traded without
state guaranteed prices and identifies the main challenges facing the
transition towards a competitive Portuguese electricity generation
market (Crispim et al., 2014). reviewed the role of ERSE in establishing
regulations to promote smart grid solutions for the Portuguese elec-
tricity market. They concluded that the lack of competition in dis-
tribution requires a more active role for ERSE in terms of defining
criteria, allocating incentives and measuring compliance. Evaluating
the performance of the Portuguese retail electricity market and its po-
tential for transforming into a competitive market have been over-
looked in the literature.
The progress in the retail market liberalization can be assessed by
several qualitative and quantitative measures introduced in the litera-
ture. Each study selects the indicators based on the aspect of the retail
market that they want to explore and the available market data
(Defeuilley, 2009). used consumers' switching, the evolution of con-
sumers’mobility, the switching costs, the number of new entrants in the
retail market and the innovations which successfully passed the market
test to evaluate whether the opening of market at the retail side yielded
the influx of new entrants stimulating processes and if it has challenged
the incumbents.
The annual reports of the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets
(Ofgem), the UK government regulator for the electricity, on the per-
formance of the retail electricity market is based on key trends such as
the changes to market structure, prices and profits on the supply side
and the developments in consumer engagement at the demand side
(Ofgem, 2016). For the market structure, the focus is on the market
shares of the suppliers to show the degree of competitive pressure that
the suppliers can exert on each other. The prices and profits indicators
are used to show the trends across available tariff types and contracts,
and the prices that the suppliers offer to different customer groups. In
order to indicate the switching and consumer experience, the trends in
external switching (between suppliers) and internal switching (within
the current supplier) is used to find out the levels of consumer en-
gagement (Ofgem, 2016). Ofgem also used cost pass through to indicate
the competitive pressures faced by suppliers. In competitive markets, it
is expected that the cost increases will be passed to consumers
promptly. The same argument is also expected in reverse. In other
words, it is expected that the wholesale cost falls also pass quickly to
the end-users. In order to test the asymmetry, the long-run relationship
between supplier costs and customer bills were investigated by Ofgem
(Ofgem (2011). Due to the lack of sufficient data in the Portuguese
market and the fact that the retail rates in Portugal are updated an-
nually by the retailers, we were not able to perform this analysis for the
case of Portugal.
The core of this research is a quantitative empirical study, which
makes use of publicly available data on Portugal's retail electricity
market during the years 2008–2015. Several indicators can be used to
show the level of competition in the retail markets and the evolution of
the market towards a free competitive market. In this paper, the evo-
lution of the retail prices since the beginning of the liberalization in
Portugal's retail electricity market and the relationship between
wholesale and retail prices, changes in the market concentration, and
switching behavior of customers are studied. The level of retail
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competition in Portugal and its influence on the energy component of
the end-users’ electricity price is evaluated. In the remainder of this
section, the three main aspects of the analysis are explained in more
detail.
4.1. Electricity price
A variety of different products are offered to customers in liberal-
ized retail markets by electricity suppliers. The variety in the contracts
extends beyond the duration and billing (Littlechild, 2006a). Retailers
typically offer three types of contracts with different price setting be-
haviors: (1) fixed-price contracts, (2) variable-price contracts, and (3)
spot-price contracts.
The fixed-price contracts are the conventional pricing schemes, with
a pre-specified price scheme for the duration of the contract. The
variable tariffs contracts are contracts with time-of-use pricing schemes.
Different tariffs are offered to customers for different times of the day in
these types of contracts. The spot price contracts are linked to the price
movements in the wholesale market and reflect the wholesale market
price and the distribution tariffs (Mirza and Bergland, 2012). Retailers
may avoid frequent changes in the retail rates in harmony with the
wholesale price changes due to the cost of notifying the customers for
price changes in advance. They also have more tendency to transmit the
upward price changes to the customers than the downward price
changes. The frequent upward retail price changes may lead to the loss
of customers’ confidence (Mirza and Bergland, 2012).
Electricity tariff regimes vary between different markets and dif-
ferent customer segments. Electricity tariffs usually include a fixed
charge for residential consumers, which is independent of the amount
of electricity consumed. This component is typically known as con-
nection charge. The retail rates in this paper refer only to the variable
component of electricity tariffs that increases with the amount of con-
sumption (Cai et al., 2013). This component is comprised of different
elements, which charge the end-users for energy and supply, network
costs, and taxes and levies. In a competitive retail market with a suf-
ficient number of electricity suppliers electricity can be delivered from
the wholesale market to the retail end-users at low margins, especially
if the customers are expected to switch to a supplier with lower retail
rates (Olsen et al., 2006). The main target of the retail market liberal-
ization in the electricity sector is to transfer the changes in the
wholesale market price to the retail rates in order to benefit the end
users from the market deregulation. The wholesale market prices are
used as the departure point to evaluate the impact of liberalization on
consumer prices and to assess the cost reflectiveness during the tran-
sition period (Karahan and Toptas, 2013).
4.2. Switching rates
Customers are classified based on their behavior in a competitive
retail market as active or passive. There are several definitions for an
active customer. For instance, if active customers are defined as those
who have changed their supplier and those who have stayed with the
last resort supplier after making inquiries, only the first group is ob-
servable. Therefore, the percentage of active customers is usually ap-
proximated by the rate of switchers (Defeuilley, 2009), and the
minimum requirement is considered as switching to the competitive
segment. Passive customers have never switched. They may even pay
considerably in excess of the best offers available in the market at a
given time (Von Der Fehr and Hansen, 2009).
It is essential to evaluate consumer behavior in order to have a
clearer view of the potential of retail market liberalization. The share of
active customers can show the development of competitiveness in the
retail market.
It is not easy for the end-users to overcome the habit and inertia of
remaining at regulated retail rates due to the legacy of monopoly,
where the prices were regulated and customers had no options
(Benedettini and Stagnaro, 2015). Furthermore, the persistence of
regulated rates in the free market structure reduces the attraction of
deregulated offers for the customers. In some markets, such as Italy,
Spain, France, Portugal, and Denmark, the regulated retail rates are
retained, which is a barrier to the active engagement of customers
(Benedettini and Stagnaro, 2015). Switching between the retail com-
panies is promoted by increasing customer awareness about price,
contracts, and available options. Informative websites ensure the easy
access of customers to these data, simulating costs under contracts with
each of the licensed retailers or suggesting contracts that best suit their
consumption pattern (Kuleshov et al., 2012).
The customers’ insights and perceptions determine when they are
likely to terminate the retail contracts and change their suppliers.
Customer behaviors depend on the historical changes in the market
dynamic. For instance, the electricity consumers in Norway have been
historically exposed to pool price volatility due to the dominant share of
hydropower units in their generation mix. Accordingly, they are fa-
miliar with paying floating rates for electricity and avoid paying a risk
premium for fixed-price contracts (Littlechild, 2006a; Mirza and
Bergland, 2012).
4.3. Market concentration
Competitive markets are identified by the high number of suppliers
participating in the market and the low market concentration indices
(ACER/CEER, 2015). The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), ex-
pressed in equation (1), shows the degree of market concentration of a
particular industry in a geographic region (Chang, 2007). HHI is cal-
culated by adding the sum of the squares of the market shares of the
firms in a particular market. HHI is commonly accepted by economists
to measure concentration levels. When the whole percentages are used,
the HHI ranges from 0 to 10,000. The lower value is obtained when a
very large number of firms exist in the industry and the higher value is
for the situation with a single firm in the market (Bhattacharyya, 2011).
The market is moderately concentrated when the HHI is between 1500











Concentration ratios reflect the output of a given number of firms in
an industry. Equation (2) shows the calculation of CR4, which re-
presents the sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in a
market (ACER/CEER, 2015). CR4 is used in this study to show the ex-
tent of market control of the largest electricity suppliers in Portugal and









On the supply side, there are electricity retailers that are only lim-
ited to the regional market recognized by the distribution area of the
associated distributor. In contrast, there are retailers not confined to the
regional markets who compete for market share in other regions (Von
Der Fehr and Hansen, 2009). Competitive retail electricity markets
usually experience high entry and exit activity of suppliers. The retail
electricity providers in the EU countries were interviewed by the
Agency for the Cooperation of the Energy Regulators (ACER) about the
barriers of entering the developing retail electricity markets at the EU
level. The main perceived barriers were the noticeable differences be-
tween the regulatory frameworks of the member countries, retail price
regulation, high probability of future regulatory developments and low
liquidity of the wholesale market (ACER/CEER, 2015).
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5. Findings and discussion
5.1. Electricity price
Figs. 1 and 2 respectively indicate the average retail electricity
prices for residential customers at bands DC (2500 kWh < Annual
consumption< 5000 kWh) and DD (5000 kWh < Annual consump-
tion<15000 kWh) in Portugal and Spain. Band DC represents house-
holds with medium standard annual consumption. The retail rates in
these figures do not include connection charges and only reflect the
energy component of the customers’ bills. In Spain, the full customer
retail choice has been available since 2003 (London Economics, 2012).
The electricity retail prices are taken from the Eurostat official database
(EUROSTAT, 2016) and the wholesale market prices are taken from the
Iberian Market Operator (OMIE, 2016). The share of taxes and levies
(including value-added tax) in the total price of electricity are also
shown. The relationship between the changes in the average wholesale
and retail prices in Portugal and Spain during the years 2008–2015 can
be seen in Figs. 3 and 4. The spot price in Portugal and Spain is usually
the same, except for the periods with congestion in the interconnection,
which requires market splitting (ERSE, 2016).
In order to provide a measure of the extent to which retail prices
have followed the wholesale prices, the potential gains of a typical
domestic customer in bands DC and DD in Portugal and Spain from
switching to a spot-price contract rather than a fixed-price contract
during the year are compared. The MIBEL prices with a fixed mark up of
0.02 €/kWh for the services that the retailers offer are considered as the
spot price product (Von Der Fehr and Hansen, 2009). Table 1 shows the
expected gains from switching to a spot-price contract. For example, a
domestic Portuguese customer in band DC who bought the spot-price
product rather than the fixed-price product in 2014 would gain €747 in
that year, or 71.8% of the annual electricity bill. The potential gain here
significantly depends on the amount of fixed markup. Therefore, we
have used this calculation for comparison purposes. The purpose is to
compare the potential gains of a customer with a similar load profile in
Spain and Portugal and also the customers in different bands at the
same market.
Figs. 3 and 4 show that the retail rates are generally not following
the reductions in the wholesale market price. For instance, despite the
reductions in the wholesale rates in 2009, the retail rates increased for
Portuguese and Spanish customers in band DC. The customers would
have achieved the highest potential gains from switching to the spot
price contracts in 2014, in which despite a slight decrease in wholesale
market prices, an increase is observed in retail rates (Table 1). In 2014,
Fig. 1. Average retail electricity prices (€/kWh) for domestic customers in band DC (EUROSTAT, 2016).
Fig. 2. Average retail electricity prices (€/kWh) for industrial customers in band DD (EUROSTAT, 2016).
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due to the favorable hydrological conditions and the decline in the coal
price, the wholesale market price decreased. The wholesale market
price was determined well below the marginal costs of combined-cycle
natural thermal plants (ERSE, 2016). Despite this decline, retail rates in
Portugal and Spain increased in 2014. Local generation and the inter-
connection availability factors are the two factors that can significantly
impact the wholesale prices. For instance, Portugal and Spain in the
first half of 2014 were among the least expensive countries in Europe,
but in the third quarter of 2014, they were among the most expensive
ones because the generation mix in these countries was pushed towards
costlier sources (European Commission, 2014).
Despite the full liberalization of the wholesale market, almost all of
electricity generated in Portugal benefits from state guaranteed prices.
This situation applies not only to renewable resources or the co-gen-
eration units, but also to conventional power plants that have entered
into a power purchase agreement (PPA) with the government in the
1990s (Amorim et al., 2013). One reason for the high retail rates in
Portugal is the guaranteed remuneration of less efficient thermal plants,
designed to operate as base-load power stations, but working only for
few hours during a day due to the increasing penetration of wind power
generation sources in Portugal.
In the early nineties, when there was a need for new generation
capacities to cover the base-load and mid-load electricity consumption
in the growing Portuguese market, investments in production were
made through long-term PPAs (Finon, 2008). Through these
agreements, the independent power producers (IPP) invested in new
power plants with a sales concession of electricity. They would have
essentially received payments to cover their fixed costs (capacity
Fig. 3. Average retail and wholesale prices in Portugal.
Fig. 4. Average retail and wholesale prices in Spain.
Table 1
Potential gain of customers in Portugal (PT) and Spain (ES) from switching to a
spot-price market.









2008 PT 314 44.2% 714 47.0%
ES 329 45.3% 328 28.9%
2009 PT 476 64.0% 820 60.1%
ES 518 65.9% 862 61.3%
2010 PT 507 65.3% 1263 69.8%
ES 594 68.8% 628 53.5%
2011 PT 549 62.6% 1501 69.4%
ES 646 66.3% 575 46.5%
2012 PT 644 67.0% 1662 72.2%
ES 743 70.1% 774 54.8%
2013 PT 688 69.3% 1670 72.8%
ES 755 71.2% 875 58.4%
2014 PT 747 71.8% 1772 75.0%
ES 810 73.4% 997 62.8%
2015 PT 734 68.9% 1278 65.7%
ES 774 70.0% 1355 67.0%
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payments), and payments to cover their variable costs that remunerate
the power supply (CEPA, 2004). PPA make the cash flow associated
with generation very secure and fully mitigates the market risks (CEPA,
2004). The existence of PPA can make a significant contribution to the
difficulties in creating competitive wholesale markets (Amorim et al.,
2013). Therefore, all of the PPAs in Portugal except two were replaced
with the legislation package of costs with the maintenance of con-
tractual equilibrium (CMEC) in 2007 (Amorim et al., 2013; CEPA,
2004). CMEC regime is a planned system of payments to reduce the
PPAs (CEPA, 2004). It is financially equivalent to and has the same
economic effect as the existing PPAs (Amorim et al., 2013; CEPA, 2004)
in terms of providing a compensation mechanism for recovering the
cost of investments made.
Currently, due to the increase in the integration of wind units, the
thermal units that were built to operate as a base-load are usually op-
erating as for back-up purposes. Therefore, the installed capacity of the
thermal power plants is underused and the fixed costs of investments in
these plants have a huge weight on the production costs, which is paid
by the end-users.
Another barrier for the effective competition in the retail sector of
the Portuguese electricity market is the tariff deficit. It usually occurs
when there exist shortfalls of revenue for energy companies as a result
of low retail rates, particularly in the regulated component of the price,
which does not reflect the actual costs of electricity production (Linden
et al., 2014). The existence of tariff deficits, as Portugal has experienced
in recent years, prevents the development of effective competition in
the retail market by forcing the end-users to cover the tariff deficit.
Electricity tariffs must be adjusted so that the utilities can recover their
fixed costs. The highest tariff deficit for utility companies in Portugal
was experienced in 2013 (Cai et al., 2013). During the economic crisis,
customers reduced their consumption; however, the costs incurred by
utility companies did not decrease proportionately, especially because
of the fixed costs that are usually recovered over decades (Cai et al.,
2013).
Over time, retail electricity and natural gas providers can also
compete in some applications, such as heating demand in the re-
sidential sector. Although the final energy choice is made by the con-
sumers and the builders, the government policies and regulations also
have a significant impact on promoting the competition (American Gas
Association, 2017). The competition among electricity and gas net-
works in Portugal can be traced to 1903, when the CRGE finished the
construction of a new electric power plant, the Central de Boavista.
CRGE then signed a contract with Lisbon's municipal to replace the
streetlights that were already powered by gas with electricity (Cardoso
de Matos, 2011).
5.2. Switching rates
The consumption share of the Portuguese customers in the regulated
and the liberalized market is shown in Fig. 5. The increasing trend of
switching to the liberalized market for residential customers started in
2013 (Fig. 6), due to the transitory tariffs applied by ERSE.
Portuguese household consumers are perceived as the most active
electricity customers in the retail market in Europe during the years
2013–2015. They had the highest switching rates among the EU
Member States in these years, despite their relatively low ratings of
choices and comparability of offers in the market (ACER/CEER, 2015).
Fig. 7 shows the switching rate for several EU countries that have
passed 6–11 years since the beginning of the liberalization process in
the retail electricity market. In Fig. 7, the switching rate for 2014 and
the annual average for years 2008–2013 are shown (ACER/CEER,
2015). The data for 2015 were not yet available for some EU countries
at the time of our research. All of the values used here incorporate the
switches within the liberalized market. Fig. 7 shows that the Portuguese
electricity household consumers have shown an active engagement in
switching their retail electricity provider. There is a significant
difference between the switching rates in 2014 and the annual average
for years 2008–2013. Portugal has the highest difference between the
switching rates in 2014 and the annual average of 2008–2013 in
Europe. In 2015, a slight decrease is observed in the switching rate of
residential customers. In this year, 27% of electricity consumers swit-
ched their electricity supplier. In December 2015, around 34% of the
switches were within the liberalized market.
Switching rates of Spain and Portugal in Fig. 7 also include
switching within the same corporate group, but different suppliers. In
the case of Portugal it includes switching from the regulated tariffs
offered by the last resort supplier (i.e. EDP Serviço Universal) to lib-
eralized market tariffs offered by a different company (i.e. EDP Co-
mercial), which are both within the same corporate. As shown in Fig. 5,
the share of consumption in the liberalized market is changing con-
stantly. The high switching rates in 2013–2015 are due to the opening
of markets to residential customers.
The limited knowledge of the customers about the potential benefits
of switching to a different retailer is a barrier to switching in the retail
market (Mukherji, 2012). Generally, the satisfaction of the users from
the company is the most important factor to motivate them to switch
(Walsh et al., 2005).
Portuguese law has allowed reversibility since January 2018, and
the consumers who have switched to the liberalized market can return
to the regulated market until 2020. Thus, as long as the transitory tariffs
exist, the customers can request to return to the regulated market. The
return may happen when the rates offered by the retailers in the lib-
eralized market are higher than the transitory tariffs. The retailers have
to present both rates in the bills for customers to compare (Simões,
2018). This law establishes confidence in the market by ensuring the
customers that they can return to the familiar system despite the market
price contract that they have made (de Suzzoni, 2009).
5.3. Market concentration
Despite the developments in the electricity market structure, and
high switching rates in Portugal, incumbents were able to maintain a
dominant market position in the free market. Fig. 8 shows the changes
in market shares of electricity retailers in Portugal since 2008.
On both HHI and CR4 indices, the retail electricity market in
Portugal remains concentrated based on indicative rule-of-thumb
thresholds. The market share of the four biggest companies in the lib-
eralized market (CR4), the market share of the cross-border retail
companies and the HHI are shown in Fig. 9. It shows that the market
share of the biggest companies in 2015 is 84.0%, which shows the high
concentration of the market. Although the market concentration levels
of the suppliers in the market have been reduced significantly since
2008, still the market is highly concentrated. The HHI here is calculated
for all consumer types. However, it is expected that the market is even
more concentrated for residential customers, as still many of them have
stayed in the regulated market.
The interconnection of the Portuguese and Spanish electric systems
and the increase in the net transfer capacity have reduced the energy
price differences between Portugal and Spain in the wholesale market.
Therefore, the financial risks of participating in the Portuguese retail
market and competing with the Portugal's incumbent electricity sup-
plier has reduced for the suppliers that operate from Spain (ERSE,
2016). The main cross-border entrants of the Portuguese retail elec-
tricity market are Endesa and Iberdrola, which respectively increased
their market shares from 2.5% to 1% in 2008 to 18.6% and 16.4% in
2015.
The level of concentration in the electricity generation segments in
Portugal is also high in terms of the installed capacity (ERSE, 2016).
EDP owns most of Portugal's power plant generation systems (ERSE,
2016). However, its superior market position is currently being eroded
by the regional and cross-border rival companies. The EDP share in the
total installed capacity fell by approximately 8% during 2009–2013
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(ERSE, 2016).
6. Conclusions and policy implications
This empirical analysis focused on the behavior of electricity con-
sumers in Portugal following the liberalization of the retail electricity
market.
The motivation underlying the liberalization practices in the retail-
side of the electricity sector is the possibility of transferring the benefits
of a deregulated market to the end-users by providing lower prices and
a wide range of contract offers.
The retail competition in Portugal's electricity market is successful
in creating new opportunities for consumers. The switching rates of
Portuguese customers show the effectiveness of the market. Setting the
transitory tariffs during the transition period convinced many end-users
to migrate to the liberalized market, despite increasing the gap between
the retail rates and the wholesale market prices. The transitory tariffs
were used as a procedure to approach the complete removal of the
regulated end-user prices. Customers had the chance to search among
the available retail electricity providers during the transition period,
which was essential to increase the awareness of the users about the
benefits of buying electricity in the liberalized market. Without the
progressive removal of the regulated rates, customers may fall into the
trap of making the wrong decision due to the lack of sufficient
information. The results of this study have implications for the pol-
icymakers in Portugal who want to efficiently transfer the benefits of
market liberalization to end-users. Portuguese governmental policies
have gone hand in hand with the EU directives in privatizing state-
controlled electricity companies and liberalizing the retail electricity
market. Overall, the integration of the Portuguese and Spanish whole-
sale electricity markets and, importantly, improving the interconnec-
tion capacity between the two countries promoted the entrance of
cross-border entrants in the Portuguese retail electricity market. As
wholesale market prices in Portugal approach the prices in Spain, the
risk of participating in the Portuguese retail market has decreased for
the main Spanish electricity suppliers.
Tariff deficits have been recognized as the main reason for the high
retail rates in Portugal. For example, in 2012 about 2.5% of the annual
electricity bill of Portuguese customers was to pay the interest of the
past five years' tariff deficits. The tariff deficit will be paid by the cus-
tomers by 2024, assuming no additional increase (Vasconcelos, 2012).
The economic crisis has aggravated the tariff deficit in Portugal. The
projected demand was higher than the actual demand and tariffs were
determined based on those expectations. During the economic crisis,
the government also had difficulties in increasing the retail rates in
order to compensate for costs. Although the economic crisis is usually
recognized as the key reason for the tariff deficit in Portugal, the deficit
can also be a consequence of electricity market dysfunction (Linden
Fig. 5. Consumption share of the Portuguese customers in the regulated and the liberalized market (ERSE, 2016).
Fig. 6. Changes in the share of different customer segments in the Portugal's liberalized retail electricity market (ERSE, 2016).
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et al., 2014). It has been widely argued that the government's inter-
vention through regulation and legislation, such as following support
policies for the renewable energy units and maintaining the structure of
the regulated rates for the retail sector have all contributed to the ap-
pearance of increasing tariff deficits.
High taxes and levies in Portugal also add to retail rates. Price-
guaranteed production, which applies to PPAs, the CMEC regime, and
feed-in tariffs, has imposed high costs on Portuguese customers. Under
such agreements, some thermal plants should be remunerated, even
when they do not produce electricity.
Besides the reintegration with generation activities, which is an
unintended outcome of unbundling in electricity markets, retailers can
hedge the risks by investing in physical assets, such as distributed
generation units or energy storage systems, or employing demand re-
sponse programs. Demand response programs can substitute for the
activities that require high initial cost or significant changes in the
structure of the entity (Finon and Boroumand, 2011). Therefore, an-
other benefit of retail market liberalization is inducing the retailers to
adopt new technologies to facilitate the demand-side participation.
Demand response is one of the means that small companies cann enter
the retailing business and manage their financial risks. However, Por-
tugal has not made any formal decision to roll-out the smart metering
throughout the country (CEER, 2013). Moreover, the role of the DSO in
implementing the demand response programs for domestic customers
with the deployment of smart grids is not well defined (CEER, 2014).
In terms of further research we would like to evaluate the impact of
retail market liberalization in Portugal on other aspects of social wel-
fare. In this regard, we plan to study the impact of retail market lib-
eralization on reducing the peak demand. Wholesale market prices
normally increase during the peak demand hours, and the retailers must
find ways to motivate their customers to consume less during these
hours to reduce the risk of financial losses. The technical and economic
aspects required for developing new policies and regulatory initiatives
to increase the capacity to change electricity usage by end-use custo-
mers and the provision of flexibility services by them will be studied in
the future works.
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